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Commentary 
What Lies Beneath: Lifting the Lid on Archaeological Computing 
 
Jeremy Huggett 
 
Archaeology, School of Humanities, University of Glasgow 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Keywords: Technology; Tools; McLuhan’s Laws of Media; Tetradic Analysis; GIS 
________________________________________________________________________________
 
‘We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape 
us’ (Culkin 1968, 60). 
 
‘The most important thing about a technology is 
how it changes people’ (Lenier 2011, 4). 
1. Thinking beyond the tool 
What do we mean when we talk about ‘thinking beyond 
the tool’ in the context of archaeological computing? The 
brief for this volume was refreshingly clear and it is 
worth reiterating it here. The challenge was: 
 to discuss the underlying theoretical concepts 
behind our methodological tools; 
 
 to examine the extent to which constraints of 
these tools alter our perceptions and 
interpretations about the past; 
 
 to investigate future directions from a theoretical 
perspective. 
Earlier attempts to do likewise have met with mixed 
success (for example, Cooper and Richards 1985; Lock 
and Brown 2000; Huggett and Ross 2004a) and, amongst 
other things, demonstrated that thinking ‘beyond tools’ is 
not an easy thing to do. In the commentary introducing 
the 2004 collection, three different levels of approach 
were identified (Huggett and Ross 2004b):  
1. the specific application, its implementation and 
use (for example, databases, GIS and viewshed 
analysis, agent-based modelling); 
2. the origins and prospects of larger-scale systems 
(for example, online National Monuments 
Records, digital data archives); 
3. the broader implications of information 
technologies within archaeology and how they 
are integrated into the subject. 
By far the most frequent are levels 1 and 2, which are 
typically found throughout the broad range of 
publications relating to aspects of computer applications  
 
in archaeology. These quite properly consider questions 
of application and the nature of the underlying model as 
part of the critique of the research results generated by 
the analysis. More rarely they go ‘beyond the tool’ and 
consider the wider implications of the application, the 
constraints it may have imposed, the way the research 
questions may have been shaped by the tool, how the tool 
may have structured the research, and so on. Level 3 
approaches are rarer still. As the common denominator 
between the three publications mentioned above and the 
present volume, I have sought various ways of looking at 
this subject in my own research, whether it is considering 
the implications of technological determinism (Huggett 
2000), thinking about issues surrounding information 
handling and processing (Huggett 2004a), or using the 
metaphor of fetishism as a medium for thinking through 
some of the characteristics and implications of the 
technological tools archaeologists use, such as 
beguilement, disguise, mystery, and gender (Huggett 
2004b). 
On the face of it, therefore, aspects of ‘thinking beyond 
the tool’ are to some extent a characteristic of virtually all 
reflective computer-using archaeologists - if only because 
demonstrating the validity of our results is in part 
dependent on demonstrating a knowledgeable application 
of the tools we use. But is this sufficient? Focus on the 
application level risks losing sight of the broader context 
from which these applications are derived and within 
which they are used. Information technologies are 
socially charged: there are issues of control, surveillance, 
power, politics, order, and structure associated with them 
- which in turn influence how archaeological knowledge 
is created, represented, manipulated, modelled, and 
understood.  
To some, this seems essentially irrelevant, either because 
it is believed to be self-evident or because the 
implications of the tools are not appreciated. For instance, 
in response to a paper arguing that computer-using 
archaeologists had largely ignored the consequences of 
the new information and communication technologies we 
have absorbed within our subject (Huggett 2004b), it was 
suggested that this approach ‘reflects more closely those 
environments in which the technological contribution is 
Huggett: What Lies Beneath: Lifting the Lid on Archeological Computing 
 
205 
 
considered predominant and computer science, which is 
often the source of financial resources, is confined to the 
role of a tool, albeit one with wonderful solutions’ 
(Moscati 2004, 13), and went on to argue that there has 
always been a clear vision of the effects of computer 
methodologies represented in the published range of 
papers and articles. In many respects, this underlined the 
very issues of beguilement and mystery that my paper 
sought (and hence presumably failed) to present: this 
broader approach is seen to be only relevant in 
circumstances where technology is the driver and the 
computer is reduced to a mere tool.  
To others, this approach seems futile and pointless. As 
archaeologists, we work within a global environment 
predicated increasingly upon ubiquitous information 
technologies. Since we cannot avoid this, we cannot 
change this, cannot step aside from this, and are 
powerless to influence this, what then is the value or 
purpose of a broader investigation of the impact of these 
tools when we should be concentrating on how best to 
use them to enhance our understanding of the past?  
I propose that the importance of standing back and taking 
this broader perspective is that, if the tools we use do 
change us, if they do affect what we do and how we do it, 
we should be paying attention to this. Culkin’s statement 
cited at the outset of this paper (commonly erroneously 
associated with Marshall McLuhan) goes on to suggest 
that our tools shape the way we organise reality - and so 
by archaeological extension, how we organise and 
understand the past. As I’ve suggested elsewhere, through 
understanding how these technologies operate on us as 
well as for us, we can seek to ensure that they serve us 
better in what as archaeologists we already do, and help 
us initiate new and innovative ways of thinking about the 
past (Huggett 2004a). Indeed, I have argued that we have 
a responsibility to do this, since not to make the attempt 
means that we remain powerless consumers in the face of 
otherwise autonomous technologies (Huggett 2004b, 89). 
Floridi offers an elegant analogy in the context of the 
growth of information and the need for a philosophical 
approach to it. which seems equally relevant in the 
context of archaeology: 
‘Our technological tree has been growing its far-reaching 
branches much more widely, rapidly, and chaotically than 
its conceptual, ethical, and cultural roots...The risk is that, 
like a tree with weak roots, further and healthier growth 
at the top might be impaired by a fragile foundation at the 
bottom...while technology keeps growing bottom-up, it is 
high time we start digging deeper, top-down, in order to 
expand and reinforce our conceptual understanding of our 
information age, of its nature, its less visible 
implications, and its impact on human and 
environmental welfare, and thus give ourselves a chance 
to anticipate difficulties, identify opportunities, and 
resolve problems, conflicts, and dilemmas’ (Floridi 2009, 
154). 
In terms of the archaeological technological tree, most 
computer-using archaeologists can demonstrate that they 
are already thinking about their tools as they use them; 
however the top-down approach is largely absent and 
may be thought to be futile or irrelevant in the face of the 
bottom-up approaches which are already evident. Why 
might this be the case? Part of the answer may be found 
in considering what we mean by ‘thinking beyond the 
tool’ and how a ‘tool’ is defined. 
2. An excursus on tools and technology 
 
‘Tool’ is a term often encountered in relation to 
archaeological use of computers - not least in the title of 
this volume - and the context within which the term is 
used can be very revealing about attitudes to information 
technologies. In one sense, computers are referred to as 
tools alongside trowels, spades, and wheelbarrows. The 
computer forms part of the general tool-kit used by 
archaeologists, albeit a tool which functions in a variety 
of different ways: simultaneously a tool for writing, 
reading, drawing, mapping, storing, retrieving, 
communicating, analysing, reconstructing, integrating, 
and disseminating our data and information. Alternatively 
(or indeed, at the same time), ‘tool’ can be used in the 
context of software or a particular application - a 
database, a GIS, a 3D modeller, each of which will 
typically contain its own specialist tools for handling, 
processing, manipulating, and presenting data. ‘Tool’ 
may therefore refer to the hardware and all it consists of, 
or specifically to the software which runs on the 
hardware, or indeed to specific elements of the software 
itself - the term is frequently used in an ambiguous and 
fluid manner which gives rise to different interpretations 
of what it means to think ‘beyond the tool’ and whether 
or not this is a worthwhile endeavour. 
This ambiguity in relation to the definition of a ‘tool’ in 
the context of information technology is not peculiar to 
archaeology. For example, Feibleman proposes that the 
design and construction of tools are the consequence of 
technology, and the subsequent use of the tool is 
associated with additional technology which determines 
how the tool is used (1967, 330). This additional 
technology includes instructions for the operation of the 
tool, and - crucially - directions and formulae for using it 
within the context for which it was designed. Although he 
is writing before the microcomputer revolution, 
Feibleman is aware of microcircuits (1967, 334), but 
significantly sees computers in the same light as 
gyroscopes and thermostats - instructions about the 
operation of the tool are built into it (1967, 335). This is 
in some respects reminiscent of Mumford’s classic 
definition of the essential distinction between a machine 
and a tool as ‘the degree of independence in the operation 
from the skill and motive power of the operator: the tool 
lends itself to manipulation, the machine to automatic 
action’ (Mumford 1934, 10). Neither definition of tool 
fits the case of the computer particularly well, but a key 
distinction is that while Feibleman’s definition places 
limitations on the function of the tool, Mumford allows 
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the use of the tool to be limited only by the skill and 
know-how of the operator. On the other hand, Feibleman 
employs a very broad concept of technology, rather than 
seeing it simply in more mechanistic terms. In both cases, 
the tool is more than simply a technical object: it achieves 
functionality through the skill of the user (Mumford) or 
the instructions embedded within it (Feibleman). 
However, the ‘tool’ approach carries within it a tendency 
to make technology seem neutral - the equivalent of the 
aphorism that guns do not kill people, people kill people. 
A tool is neither good nor bad, but is capable of being put 
to good or bad use. As Mumford originally emphasised, 
what gives the tool direction is the user: the tool ‘is in no 
position to give itself ends and is only the means of 
realising ends provided by human beings’ (Verbeek 2005, 
39). Consequently, the tool or technology is not itself at 
issue, only the way in which it has been implemented or 
used. This encourages a view of computer-based tools as 
theoretically neutral, essentially empty vessels into which 
data are poured, with interpretation only starting as 
analysis commences. Correspondingly, evaluations of the 
application of such tools and their results will tend to be 
limited by a lack of consideration of the social, cultural 
and philosophical issues associated with their use. 
Consequently the focus will be on a limited perspective 
of the tool or application rather than the wider picture. 
Mitcham (1994, 156ff) provides a broader and more 
flexible framework for considering technology, building 
on the definitions of Marx, Heidegger, Ellul, Dessauer 
and others: technology as knowledge (techniques and 
know-how), as activity (making and using), and as object 
(the material technical artefacts themselves). A similar 
framework was earlier provided by MacKenzie and 
Wajcman (1985) in which technology comprises artefacts 
and technical systems, knowledge about these artefacts 
and systems, and the practices of handling them. 
Breaking the subject down like this provides a convenient 
structure for considering the technological computer tools 
archaeologists use. The categories are not mutually 
exclusive; they can provide different perspectives on the 
problem of thinking ‘beyond the tool’. 
Technological knowledge can constitute the body of 
knowledge which gives rise to technological artefacts - 
hence the computer as technological artefact is an 
implementation of computer technology (Carlson et al. 
2010, 210). However, it can also be the know-how, rules 
of thumb, routines, sets of rules, and theories which in 
combination develop and shape the use of the technical 
artefact. These may give rise to regularities in use 
(customary behaviour and application) reinforced by 
training, teaching, and experience but may also be 
subverted and circumvented. Nor need they necessarily 
be evident. For example, Faulkner and Runde (2009, 446) 
distinguish three ways that rules may contribute causally 
to the determination of behaviour:  
 people follow rules in a deliberate, conscious 
way (such as a recipe, a manual, etc.);  
 people learn and internalise rules in such a way 
that they become essentially instinctive, but may 
be recoverable by the conscious mind (the 
improvisation of a jazz musician, for example); 
  
 people behave in appropriate ways but this does 
not involve consciously or sub-consciously 
‘knowing’ the rules (for instance, people 
conform with rules of grammar without being 
able to articulate them).  
Identifying and deconstructing which of these may apply 
is important in understanding the context of a particular 
application. 
Technological activity is, according to Mitcham, ‘that 
pivotal event in which knowledge and volition unite to 
bring artefacts into existence or to use them; it is likewise 
the occasion for artefacts themselves to influence the 
mind and will’ (1994, 209). Since technological activities 
include categories such as crafting, designing, 
manufacturing, and working, they are not strangers to 
archaeological investigation. The difference, perhaps, is 
that we are ourselves implicated in these activities which 
makes it difficult to stand as dispassionate, objective 
observers - indeed, turning the gaze inwards upon 
ourselves can quickly become an exercise in navel-
gazing. However, Ihde argues that to some degree we 
must ‘go native’ and actually become informed 
participants, since this enables us to consider and perhaps 
influence the developmental phases of technologies, as 
well as already extant philosophies and their 
effects (2004, 91). 
Technological artefacts should put archaeologists on 
familiar ground, accustomed as we are to artefact studies 
and the way that artefacts influence and structure society 
through human agency. Although technological artefacts 
can cover a whole realm of objects ranging from clothing 
and utensils through to machines and automata (Mitcham 
1994, 162), we are concerned here with computer 
hardware and software and the way the availability, 
presence, and use of these can impact on the practice of 
archaeology. This goes beyond the physical nature of the 
artefact itself - for instance, it is more than a question of 
considering the impact of miniaturisation and mobility on 
application and use. For example, Kroes and Meijers 
(2006, 2) argue that technical artefacts have a dual nature 
- they can be described in complementary ways, neither 
of which can be subsumed beneath the other. There is the 
physical object itself, but importantly there are also the 
intended functions associated with that object (similar to 
Feibleman’s ‘additional’ technology, for instance). 
However, there is also a third dimension: unintended 
functions - the use of the technical artefact in ways which 
differ from what was originally intended (Carlson et al. 
2010, 210). These are at least as important as the intended 
or designed functionality as they add a degree of 
unpredictability into the equation: the impacts and 
influences may be hidden but these are also where 
serendipity and inspiration can live. 
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So thinking ‘beyond tools’ should involve more than 
simply accounting for and justifying the use of a 
particular application. Thinking about tools in terms of 
technological knowledge, activities, and objects 
emphasises the range of implicit, explicit, and tacit 
assumptions and beliefs wrapped within a social, 
political, and technical environment. Ultimately, these 
tools do not yet create themselves - we create them, 
improve them, refine them and ultimately accept or reject 
them. They augment and scaffold our thought and 
analysis, and consequently need to be approached in a 
considered, aware, and knowledgeable manner. With that 
in mind, to what extent do the papers in this volume make 
us, as archaeologists, and the IT tools we employ the 
focus of study? 
3. A commentary on the papers 
 
Watterson looks at how the act of assembling and 
presenting an archaeological reconstruction functions as 
an interpretative process at every level, from the 
development and creation of the models through to 
audience consumption and presentation. In the process, 
she argues that archaeologists on the whole are not 
exploiting the interpretative values of creative 
technologies to their full potential, and virtual 
reconstructions often appear as an afterthought with little 
research potential - they act more as a case study for the 
technology. Although the criticism has been made before, 
her reflective approach offers the prospect of a less 
mechanistic approach to reconstruction models. 
Frankland picks up the theme of public consumption of 
virtual reconstructions and sets out to test the view that 
photo-realistic rendering removes the visual cues that the 
reconstruction is an interpretation and hence increases its 
authority. Three styles of presentation (hand-drawn 
sketch, watercolour, and photo-realistic) with three levels 
of detail were prepared and viewers’ responses evaluated. 
Archaeological concerns seemed to be largely restricted 
to specialists - perhaps unsurprisingly the popular vote 
was generally for photo-realistic presentations and there 
seems to be a reasonable appreciation of the limits of 
interpretation. The most obvious question - which of the 
three styles was ‘better’ (by whatever gauge) - is not 
asked directly, only in conjunction with the three levels 
of detail, which perhaps suggests an area for further 
consideration. The analysis provides a welcome 
consideration of how we present reconstructions and an 
evaluation of the extent to which archaeological 
assumptions about public presentation methods are borne 
out.  
Cripps responds directly to the editors’ challenge, 
looking at a range of developments in archaeological 
spatial technologies in order to show how archaeological 
theory and technological practice can be reflexively 
related. He points to the way that archaeology has been 
quick to take up new technologies and techniques and 
suggests that this can sometimes be seen as neutral but 
may be problematic in other cases - a tantalising 
comment which is developed further in this commentary. 
He recognises the way in which practitioners from other 
disciplines draw on examples from archaeology while 
archaeologists take advantage of new developments in 
other fields, but the potential implications of this are not 
developed at this time. His suggestion that modern mass 
field data capture techniques represent a shift to 
indiscriminate data capture and consequently shifts 
interpretation from the point of data collection to a post-
survey activity could represent a change in the kind of 
technological activities referred to above. However, mass 
field data capture still requires a range of decisions to be 
made about aspects of the survey procedure which, even 
if considered to be essentially practical, nevertheless have 
potential implications for the interpretative process. He 
offers the interesting prospect of complex spatial analysis 
tools becoming as commonplace as word processors and 
accessible to non-specialists: this raises the question of 
the extent to which the technological knowledge 
associated with these tools becomes regularised, tacit, 
with applications becoming procedural, even rule-based? 
The image of ‘thinking spaces’ constructed from 
semantically linked datasets is presented as a 
democratising tool, enhancing multivocality and allowing 
data and interpretations to be reviewed and challenged, 
although this follows a warning about the limitations of 
linked data, which, like all forms of data, are dependent 
on the intentions of the originator. As Cripps observes, 
this raises problems for the downstream consumers of 
such data, and it has close parallels with the idea of 
intended and unintended functions of technology which is 
worthy of further consideration. 
Katsianis turns to the use of GIS for archaeological 
excavations, suggesting that digital technologies have 
really contributed successfully only to better management 
of excavation archives rather than to the collection and 
processing of data on site (for an alternative perspective, 
see, for instance, Warwick et al. 2009). In a review of 
excavation as knowledge production,  digital information 
systems in excavation, and knowledge production 
practices  in excavation, a range of issues are flagged 
including the ‘distancing’ effect of technology, changing 
techniques (such as the shift away from excavation 
diaries), and the quality of the excavation record and the 
consequences for subsequent analysis. All these have 
implications for both excavation practice and the use of 
digital technologies, and would be worthy of more 
detailed consideration than is possible here. He presents a 
conceptual model based on the ‘What’, ‘Where’, ‘When’ 
triptych which is already used across a variety of different 
application areas (including archaeological archives). 
Some of the issues raised about knowledge representation 
have been addressed by, for example, LP Archaeology’s 
Archaeological Recording Kit (ARK)1, as used by Dufton 
and Fenwick elsewhere in this volume. For example, in 
the ‘What’ discussion, the question of new entities arising 
that cannot be integrated into predefined categories can 
be handled in ARK through its ‘fragments’ model. The 
                                                            
1 http://ark.lparchaeology.com/ 
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‘Where’ discussion presents examples of 3D grids and b-
rep models of excavation deposits, but there is no 
reference to the recording limitations that he refers to 
earlier which could have significant consequences for the 
resulting models. Clearly, the final implementation in 
ArcScene has some limitations in terms of its 
presentational and 3D capabilities, but the potential is 
clearly demonstrated. A detailed consideration of value 
would be worthwhile, especially given the conclusion 
that ‘the effective introduction of new technologies in 
excavation is directly related to their role in reassessing 
and improving the ways we interact with reality to create 
knowledge about the past’. 
González-Pérez presents an approach to the description 
of archaeological entities that avoids classification as an a 
priori mechanism, using instead the entity’s properties as 
units of description. He argues that this avoids category 
bias and that classification can still be subsequently 
applied if desired. The discussion of inflexibility of 
category systems, in that they are incapable of 
recognising new variants and hence wrongly force 
entities into inappropriate categories is perfectly valid, 
and could be usefully compared with the capabilities of 
the ARK system referred to above. A typeless 
information modelling approach is outlined, which moves 
directly from the entity itself to identifying its properties, 
omitting its classification. The question therefore 
becomes which relevant properties define the entity rather 
what the entity actually is in the first place, and if 
required sets of properties can be linked subsequently to a 
classification. González-Pérez recognises that the 
determination of properties and the description of their 
values is a complex mix of cognitive processes, perhaps 
omitting that these properties do not necessarily arise 
naturally in the absence of categorisation. The 
determination of the properties of an object will, at least 
in part, be derived from past experience, a priori 
knowledge, comparison with others, and hence the 
typeless approach is not as truly objective as it might 
appear. In other words, some aspects of category will 
tend to be captured within the definition of properties. 
Whether we can really avoid classification like this 
remains questionable - arguably consciously or sub-
consciously we classify or categorise what we see, 
identifying an object for what (we think) it is. Only when 
it is not recognised is recourse made to description in 
terms of properties alone, and even then these may arise 
through comparison with something which is known. 
González-Pérez recognises the problem that the cognitive 
processes employed in constructing properties are subject 
to bias to the same extent as those involved in 
categorisation, arguing that the problem is less since 
properties are atomised relative to category and do not 
determine the structure of the information in the way that 
categorisation does. However true this might be, there 
remains the issue that we categorise and identify things 
all the time and to do otherwise goes against natural 
thought processes and risks making early categorisation 
implicit rather than explicit. Ultimately, it would seem 
that the only way to record objects reliably through 
properties alone would be to attempt to record 
‘everything’. 
Wu and Lock focus on the spatial construction of social 
relations, examining the relationship between the spatial 
and the social, applying Ingold’s ‘wayfaring’ theory to 
demonstrate how social relations may be influenced by 
human agents moving around a settlement. The model 
incorporates access diagrams and space syntax as the 
basis for developing a meshwork of social relations. Least 
cost path analysis is used to reconstruct the pathways 
from a household which are then accumulated together to 
highlight the pathway density, with high density 
pathways suggesting more social interactions and vice 
versa. It is an elegant approach, and in terms of ‘thinking 
beyond the tool’ the paper is more a case of ‘having 
thought beyond the tool’, presenting what is effectively a 
new tool. Wu and Lock suggest that the focus of many 
spatial technologies is on location and order, and rarely 
are they used to investigate how people interact with the 
surrounding spatial structure, although much agent-based 
modelling seeks to do precisely that. 
Pethen looks to develop an approach for integrating GIS 
and phenomenology in the analysis of ancient Egyptian 
ritual landscapes and mining sites. In a discussion of the 
relationship between GIS and phenomenological 
approaches to landscape, she suggests that the 
deterministic perspective of GIS is more to do with the 
way in which it is presented: a tendency for 
archaeological research questions to be used as GIS ‘case 
studies’, hence suggesting to phenomenologists who are 
predisposed to be distrustful of GIS that the technology is 
more important than the archaeological question. 
Furthermore, limitations in understanding landscape tend 
to be addressed by seeking more technological solutions - 
as is demonstrated here by Wu and Lock in a different 
context. She recognises the limitations of phenomenology 
and argues that both GIS and phenomenology require 
additional material to explore visual experience fully and 
to grapple with ancient perceptions of contemporary 
worlds. The method described relies on the presence of 
textual material to provide information on ancient 
attitudes and experience of landscape to ensure the work 
is theoretically sound - in this respect, what is being 
developed sounds not too dissimilar to the kind of 
historical GIS which would be recognised by GIS-using 
historians. The paper is explicitly a work in progress and 
hence steps back from the point of actual application 
which means that so far the strength of the argument 
remains untested, although one might suppose that the 
integration of textual sources within historical GIS more 
generally would provide some room for optimism. 
Verhagen and Jeneson summarise an attempt to predict 
the course of a stretch of Roman road using least cost 
path analysis to find the optimal connections between two 
or more locations based on distance and effort. They 
suggest that in most cases it is hard to judge whether 
these models are good at predicting past routes since the 
physical evidence is usually limited. Indeed, in a detailed 
and introspective discussion, the result generated 
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conforms broadly to expectations although they express a 
lack of confidence in the results. Nevertheless, they see 
the positive benefits of attempting to model in terms of 
comparing different outcomes. Verhagen and Jeneson 
explicitly address ‘thinking beyond the tool’ although 
they felt that they were forced to think more about the 
tool than beyond it. They suggest we are still lacking the 
appropriate ‘spatial language’ and accompanying 
toolboxes, and feel that more energy should be invested 
in developing software tools that will allow us to more 
easily compare different theoretical perspectives. The 
emphasis is therefore once more on seeking technological 
solutions for archaeological problems. 
Fiz, Subias and Cuesta outline an approach to modelling 
the landscape of Oxyrhynchus using a range of different 
sources. They describe the detailed collection and 
assembly of a variety of textual, cartographic, and 
satellite datasets in order to reconstruct the nineteenth-
century landscape around ancient Oxyrhnchus in order to 
attempt to identify earlier features. An essentially 
descriptive account, this is an interesting exercise in 
source analysis and methodology and their results 
underline the importance of ground-truthing data. 
Dufton and Fenwick see the development of web-based 
technologies as a way of integrating and disseminating 
burial and funerary data, as well as providing a tool for 
complex and spatial chronological analyses. Amongst 
other things, they argue that the standardisation of 
recording methodologies has created a significant gap 
between data and interpretation in site practice - as they 
say, restricting the contribution of the excavator to a 
series of prompted pro-forma fields often also has the 
unintended effect of denying them the interpretative 
voice. In many respects, therefore, their contribution 
aligns with those of Katsianis and González-Pérez in that 
they are seeking ways of modelling and structuring 
complex data. Their solution is found in the application 
of LP Archaeology’s Archaeological Recording Kit, 
which employs a hybrid Entity-Attribute-Value data 
model grouping different categories of data ‘fragments’ 
(text strings, images, dates, actions, plans, locations, etc.) 
under a primary record identifier within a web-based 
environment. Given the other contributors elsewhere in 
this volume who share their search for greater flexibility 
in data representation, this model could have benefitted 
from a more detailed explanation of the methodology. 
Although Dufton and Fenwick note that other systems are 
under development, there is a high-profile alternative that 
is already highly developed. The Integrated 
Archaeological Data Base (IADB) has been in use for 
many years and developed as a comprehensive web-based 
excavation recording and post-excavation processing 
system through the Silchester VERA project (for 
instance, see Warwick et al. 2009 and example outcomes 
in Clarke et al. 2007). It would be interesting to see a 
comparison at different levels between IADB/VERA and 
ARK, since they represent two of the most developed 
systems in general archaeological use. 
Massung examines the response of visitors to location-
based media presentations at heritage sites. She 
recognises that prior research has typically concentrated 
on the capabilities and implementation of the technology, 
and instead focuses on whether there is actual visitor 
demand for such interpretations and what might be 
necessary to move the experience beyond experimental 
novelty. Questionnaire-based analysis at Bath’s Roman 
Baths (in relation to existing audio tours) and a prototype 
location-based design at the Clifton Suspension Bridge 
showed that there was no difference between user 
preferences in terms of method of delivery. Although 
location-based media were not rated as a significant 
improvement in the delivery of information, neither were 
they significantly worse. Given the increasing use of 
location-aware smartphones, this is an interesting 
demonstration that new technological solutions will not 
necessarily be preferred, perhaps until they become more 
common elsewhere. Indeed, as Massung observes, the 
increased availability of mobile internet may mean 
visitors no longer need specially created ‘tours’ and 
‘guides’, which would demonstrate an unanticipated 
outcome of the technology. 
Brughmans discusses the application of social network 
analysis in archaeology. In the process, he highlights a 
range of issues including the challenge of deriving 
individual human behaviour indirectly through material 
remains, the reduction of social interactions to a limited 
number of variables, the inherent tautology in which the 
phenomenon under study becomes the technique used to 
study it, and the way that the methodology generally 
assumes knowledge of the whole network when reality 
limits this to local awareness of a restricted network. He 
proposes some archaeological solutions to these problems 
and argues that social network analysis holds 
considerable potential for understanding aspects of past 
societies, although a concrete archaeological example of 
the implementation of the tool would be welcome. 
Indeed, ‘thinking beyond the tool’ in some respects 
relates to ways of improving the tool in terms of dealing 
with its potential archaeological use. 
4. Digging deeper 
 
Robert Zemeckis’ thriller/horror film What Lies Beneath 
received a mixed critical reception on its release in 2000: 
Empire magazine rather magnificently described it as ‘... 
an enjoyably giddy ride, certainly, but once you’re back 
from the edge of your seat, you realise most of the creaks 
and groans are from the decomposing script’2. This 
collection of papers may provide a giddy ride but the 
scripts are rather better than the film in this case! 
However, revisiting the original objectives and 
considering the success of ‘thinking beyond the tool’, it is 
fair to say that the results are mixed. In many cases we 
tread familiar ground in the sense of reviews of specific 
applications and their implementation and use - only a 
                                                            
2http://www.empireonline.com/reviews/ReviewComplete.
asp?FID=6237 
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few go beyond to consider the wider implications, 
constraints, effects, and impacts of these tools. Novelty of 
application and new technological solutions, 
commendable though they may be, are only part of 
‘thinking beyond the tool’. So how might we proceed? 
How can we break out of this cycle that has been evident 
for twenty-five years or more, in which we review our 
tools within the context of their application, but rarely 
look beyond them?  
To reiterate Floridi’s argument quoted earlier, we need to 
start digging deeper if we are to gain a greater 
understanding of the tools we use in the search for 
understanding the past. One approach would be to draw 
upon the kind of framework discussed above for thinking 
about technology. However, while it provides a useful 
means of considering technological knowledge, activities, 
and artefacts, it is perhaps insufficiently problem-oriented 
to help drive this question forward, especially if we are 
seeking to break out of a cycle in which these bigger 
issues are consistently not addressed. Of course, the risk 
in doing so is that we sail off onto a sea of generalisations 
about society and lose sight of the stuff of archaeology, in 
the process laying ourselves open to accusations of 
irrelevance. Somehow we need a means of digger deeper 
into the wider nature of our tools, tacit and implicit, while 
at the same time experience suggests we are most 
comfortable thinking about our tools within the 
immediate context of their applications.  
One way of developing a greater critical scrutiny is to 
consider Marshall McLuhan’s Laws of Media (presented 
posthumously in McLuhan and McLuhan 1988, but 
initially presented in McLuhan 1975, 1977) as a means of 
understanding the effects of our technological artefacts on 
ourselves and our practice. These are not laws as such - 
McLuhan saw them as exploratory tools or ‘probes’ that 
provide insights into the effects of a technology: they are 
more heuristic device than scientific method. According 
to McLuhan (1977, 175), there are four ‘laws’ or 
observations on the impacts of human artefacts on us: 
 Amplification: what aspects of human function 
does it enhance or amplify? 
 
 Obsolescence: what does it eclipse or supersede 
that had previously been extensively used? 
 
 Retrieval: what was previously obsolescent but 
now comes back into use? 
 
 Reversal: what does it reverse or flip into when 
developed to its full potential? 
These ‘laws’ effectively captured and summarised all of 
McLuhan’s earlier work and insights (Grosswiler 1996; 
Levinson 1999, 187). For example, using these laws, 
radio can be seen as enhancing access to mass audiences, 
it makes print obsolescent, it retrieves the town crier who 
had been largely obsolesced by print, and, when pushed 
to its technological limits, it flips into the audiovisual 
medium of television. As Levinson (1999, 188) 
emphasises, what this demonstrates is that the four laws 
rarely generate singular effects - radio cannot be reduced 
to the four impacts identified above: we can also see 
radio as making obsolete face-to-face conversation as 
well as the wiring and cables of the telephone and 
telegraph, for example. In the same way, depending on 
the starting point the computer can seen as the outcome 
of the reversal of the television, the book, the film theatre, 
and so on. Consequently, there is greater depth and 
complexity to the application of these heuristics than 
might at first be apparent. Levinson points to a 
resemblance with Hegel’s dialectic (McLuhan 1977, 173, 
Levinson 1999, 192-3) in which a thesis or position is 
countered with an antithesis or opposite idea, with the 
best of both being brought together in a synthesis. Where 
McLuhan departs is in his use of retrieval, which 
provides a historical basis for predicting future impacts. 
In the process, Hegel’s triad is developed into a tetrad by 
McLuhan (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 22Thinking about tools using McLuhan’s tetrad. 
 
The tetrad model brings out a series of inherent 
oppositions within the laws: as McLuhan observes, 
‘Retrieval is to Obsolescence as Amplification is to 
Reversal - and - Retrieval is to Amplification as 
Obsolescence is to Reversal’ (1977, 177). Understanding 
what a tool enhances is increased by an appreciation of 
what it retrieves from the past; perceiving what a tool 
supersedes is heightened by thinking about what it 
reintroduces and builds upon. 
This is only a very brief outline of McLuhan’s laws and it 
is not claimed here that their application will create some 
kind of ‘truth’ - indeed, as Tyler (2008) emphasises, the 
laws of media do not lend themselves to falsifiability 
since illustrative examples can be readily stretched to fit. 
McLuhan himself saw the laws simply as a means of 
investigation, and it is in this light that they are presented 
here. McLuhan claimed that the laws represent ‘an order 
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of thought and experience’ (1975, 75), while Sui and 
Goodchild observe that ‘As an exploratory probe resting 
on a set of questions, instead of a bounded theory, the 
tetrad will facilitate our simultaneous understanding and 
integral awareness’ (2003, 10). The proposal here, 
therefore, is that answering these four questions aids in 
bringing the kind of critical scrutiny that is required in 
‘thinking beyond the tool’. 
5. Thinking with tetrads 
Although not widely applied beyond McLuhanite circles, 
these laws have been used as a means of addressing 
varied fields ranging from digital game theory (Tyler 
2008), blogging (MacDougall 2005), hypertext 
(Moulthrop 1993), location-based services (Sui 2004), 
and social GIS (Sui and Goodchild 2003). By way of an 
example, the following discussion takes the tetradic 
analysis of GIS by Sui and Goodchild (2003) as a starting 
point, whilst applying an archaeological perspective. 
GIS enhance  
The introduction and use of GIS within archaeology has 
transformed our ability to handle locational data and in 
the process influenced everything from the management 
of excavation data through to National Monument 
Records. GIS make the integration of different categories 
of data feasible, even if collected under different spatial 
systems, and in the conjunction of these different data 
new information can be revealed. The business of 
creating maps has been made more accessible, even 
democratised. GIS also bring with them access to a host 
of different spatial and statistical analytical tools, placing 
a varied and complex toolbox at our fingertips and 
providing the facilities to expand the tool-set by 
developing new instruments for archaeological 
application. In many respects, the capability of GIS to 
incorporate and manipulate the range of data can be seen 
as a way of helping us handle the tide of information that 
threatens to swamp us. Ultimately, one might claim, with 
some justification, that GIS have been implicated in the 
transformation of the subject itself. 
GIS make obsolete  
GIS have made traditional map-making almost redundant 
- we rarely spend time preparing maps at drawing tables 
with permatrace, while letraset and leaky or blocked 
rotring pens are nostalgic memories. (Indeed, 
coincidentally, I have just converted my own traditional 
drafting table into a computer desk as a diversion whilst 
writing this paper). The widespread availability of digital 
data in repositories and archives makes it less necessary 
to seek out the data personally - Sui and Goodchild go 
further and point to a decline in traditional field 
techniques, reducing the current collection of primary 
data since so many secondary datasets are available 
(2003, 11), though this is perhaps rather less true of 
archaeology. Certainly data collection tasks that would 
previously have taken weeks or months in libraries 
trawling through journals and reports can now often be 
undertaken with a simple query to a database, followed 
by some manipulating and massaging to get the data into 
the desired form. More controversially, perhaps, Sui and 
Goodchild suggest that some analytical skills have also 
become obsolete through the use of GIS - the black box 
effect of button-clicking means that complex tasks can be 
undertaken with relatively little understanding of what is 
actually taking place – ‘one of the consequences of access 
to powerful GIS tools may be a greater interest in doing 
the thing right rather than in doing the right thing’ (2003, 
11). 
GIS retrieve  
Classically GIS have been associated with a resurgence 
of processual and deterministic approaches in 
archaeology, revisiting the quantitative and scientific 
methods of the 1960s and 1970s and hence were, and in 
some respects still are, locked into methodologies from 
the past (see also Pethen, this volume). Additionally, Sui 
and Goodchild point to the use of GIS as bringing a re-
emphasis on narrative and rhetoric - the ease of creation 
and availability of maps and images provide more than 
just visual cues since behind them are stories to be told: 
they have become ‘rhetorical devices to create meaning 
and discourse’ (2003, 12). 
GIS reverse into  
The way GIS model data imposes constraints and 
potentially excludes different representations of 
knowledge. Lock and Harris (2000, xvii) criticised the 
spatial determinism imposed by the requirements of 
points, lines, polygons, and pixels, for example, and 
complex data are required to be partitioned into layers. 
Important considerations such as positional uncertainty, 
boundary uncertainty, thematic uncertainty, and temporal 
and cognitive representations are handled with only 
limited degrees of success. Despite this, as many have 
commented, the outputs of GIS - like those of 3D 
modelling - can carry connotations of truth or fact, 
generating a false sense of what is real. Consequently 
there is a risk that ‘computerisation of the natural and 
cultural may inevitably lead to the naturalisation and 
culturalisation of the computerised’ (Sui and Goodchild 
2003, 12) and we increasingly become trapped in 
particular modes of knowing, separated from the real 
world as well as the world of the past that we seek to 
access.  
Doubtless there is room for discussion about what is and 
is not included - even which heading certain statements 
appear under - and it is clear there is no single answer to 
each question, but that is the point of the exercise. It also 
becomes apparent that, despite McLuhan’s claim that all 
four laws apply simultaneously, it is difficult to respond 
fully to the law of reversal since we cannot yet know how 
things will develop in the future - we can only really 
comment on possible trajectories while at the same time 
attempting to avoid excessively dystopian overtones.  
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Having characterised a response to the four laws, we can 
then consider examples of the oppositions between them. 
Retrieval: Obsolescence 
An example here is the retrieval of processual, 
quantitative techniques versus the obsolescence of 
analytical skills (the development of the black box). As 
discussed elsewhere (Huggett 2004a), the conjunction of 
systems theory and the New Archaeology in the 1970s 
encouraged a mechanistic view of the world as 
represented most clearly in the computers which required 
a formalised, algorithmic, definition of tasks and data in 
order to facilitate the analyses. Increasingly user-
friendliness, ease of data input, push-button applications, 
and the guarantee of (usually) attractive outputs can lead 
inexorably to a black box approach in which there is little 
understanding of the underlying systems required in order 
to use the tool, and which may in turn lead to invalid or 
inappropriate outcomes going unrecognised. 
Enhance: Reversal 
An obvious opposition is on the one hand the benefits of 
data management and manipulation, but on the other 
hand, the constraints imposed as a consequence of the 
data models applied. GIS facilitate handling of multiple 
large complex datasets, but they do so by requiring that 
data to be presented in particular ways. Consequently the 
application of computers in archaeology is predicated on 
the properties of the digital model (Lock 1995, 14) and 
that digital model is itself predicated on the properties of 
computers. 
Retrieval: Enhance 
Here the re-emphasis on storytelling and the use of 
imaging as rhetorical devices can be set against the 
enhancement of access to data and the ease with which it 
can be mapped and presented. GIS can arguably refocus 
away from the limitations of manual map-making and 
facilitate the communication of transformations and 
change through the transformation and changes between 
multiple images of data. 
Obsolescence: Reversal 
The obsolescence of traditional cartography versus the 
limitations of the means of representation exchanges the 
restrictions of manual illustration for the flexibility of 
computer-generated images, but in the process reveals the 
limits of representation which fall short of what we intend 
or require. In a similar manner, the obsolescence of 
lengthy and complex data collection processes as a result 
of the increased availability of digital data can be 
contrasted with the implications raised by increasing use 
and reliance on secondary computerised datasets which 
may be far removed from their original context of 
creation and use.  
Considering oppositions like these draws to the surface 
often paradoxical or contradictory effects of using the 
tools and, at the same time, helps to understand those 
effects.  
6. Conclusions 
 
The GIS case study summarised here focuses on a tool in 
the sense of a single category of software used by 
archaeologists, and others could equally well be 
presented - databases or 3D modellers, for example. The 
same technique can also be applied to tools within such 
software packages (for example, constructing digital 
elevation models, or generating viewshed analyses) and 
to hardware applications (for example, the use of on-site 
tablet computers for recording, laser scanning for survey). 
For instance, using a tablet computer onsite can be seen 
to enhance through simplified interaction, and all data 
captured is born digital with potentially instant automatic 
data exchange and communication; it would obsolesce 
the laptop computer, the planning board, the context file 
and the day book; it would retrieve the drawing slate, the 
chalkboard, even the clay or stone tablet; and it would 
reverse through the risk of diversion - surreptitious use of 
Twitter and Facebook, games of Angry Birds, and so on. 
It is left to the reader to fill in the gaps or extend the 
example further, rather than labour the point that the 
technique is applicable at all levels and to all types of 
tool. 
At the outset of this paper, it was argued that, although 
archaeologists are capable of thinking about their tools, 
and frequently do so in the context of specific 
applications or case studies (as exemplified by many of 
the cogent contributions in this volume), we seem to find 
it more difficult to think beyond the tool in order to 
consider the ways in which these tools impact upon us 
and our practice, shape our perceptions and alter our 
interpretations. One means of overcoming this limitation 
is to seek inspiration outside of archaeology itself and to 
recognise that other fields exist for the very purpose of 
considering the development, effects, and implications of 
new technologies. This in itself is not a novel proposal: 
for example, Denning (2000) highlights the potential of 
History and Philosophy of Science and Science and 
Technology Studies as sources of provocation for 
archaeologists. At the same time, however, it has to be 
recognised that it is possible to go too far in this respect - 
to lose sight of the archaeological objective. It is also 
possible to be overly utopian or dystopian in considering 
the impact and potential of these technologies and indeed 
utopianism is a frequent characteristic of archaeological 
discussions of technological tools. However, one of the 
advantages of the approach outlined here is the way in 
which utopian/dystopian perspectives are tempered 
through the application of these laws - a potential for 
utopianism in discussing enhancement and dystopianism 
in discussing reversal is balanced to a degree by 
consideration of retrieval and obsolescence. 
No grand claims are made for the approach proposed 
here; the argument is simply that by applying these 
questions, or questions like them, it is possible to break 
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the mould which has been evident for the past twenty-five 
years in terms of published contributions that have sought 
to address this issue. In short, thinking outside the box 
can help us think beyond the tool. 
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